The Case For Proportional Representation

The U.S. political system was built on compromise. Sometimes it works amazingly well. Often it does not. The two-party system is a significant part of the problem, but electoral reforms like proportional representation might help solve it by opening up the door for third parties to have their voices heard.  

The two-party system developed soon after the U.S. Constitution was ratified, but it was always viewed with distrust. Even all the way back in 1796, President George Washington emphasized the problems that political parties bring.

"However [political parties] may now and then answer popular ends, they are likely in the course of time and things, to become potent engines, by which cunning, ambitious, and unprincipled men will be enabled to subvert the power of the people and to usurp for themselves the reins of government, destroying afterwards the very engines which have lifted them to unjust dominion." 

At the time, the Democratic-Republican Party opposed the Federalist Party, primarily differing over centralization of government (the Federalists) and strictness of interpretation of Constitutional constraints on the Federal government (Democratic-Republicans).

James Madison, however, emphasized that having numerous political factions was a better way to control the oppressive tendencies of individual factions in the Federalist Papers No.10.

“The fewer the distinct parties and interests, the more frequently will a majority be found of the same party; and the smaller the number of individuals composing a majority, and the smaller the compass within which they are placed, the more easily will they concert and execute their plans of oppression. Extend the sphere, and you take in a greater variety of parties and interests; you make it less probable that a majority of the whole will have a common motive to invade the rights of other citizens; or if such a common motive exists, it will be more difficult for all who feel it to discover their own strength, and to act in unison with each other.” 

The problem is, the electoral system has been completely altered to remove many of the protections that were put in place by the Founding Fathers which ensured that such monopolies on factional power did not arise.

The Electoral College, for example, was quickly castrated by state laws forcing electors to take an oath to vote for the candidate who receives the popular vote of their state, thus preventing them from being able to deliberate over the best candidate as was intended.

Such an intention is exemplified by Alexander Hamilton in The Federalist Papers No. 68, which says “A small number of persons, selected by their fellow citizens from the general mass, will be most likely to possess the information and discernment requisite to such complicated [tasks].”

Now, a record high 43% of Americans do not identify as one of the major political parties. 

Proportional representation is one possible solution to this issue. 

Germany, for example, has a parliamentary system of legislature with proportional representation, and there are six primary political parties that share power as of the 2021 elections. 

Most other countries that use proportional representation also have a parliamentary system, so it would likely take some work to adapt it to the United States, which has a bicameral legislature, including both the Senate and a House of Representatives.  

The best place to apply proportional representation would be in the House of Representatives and state (if applicable) lower chambers of Congress. 

There are two major barriers to doing so.

In a typical proportional representation system, there is a popular vote that divides a set amount of seats by the percentage of those who voted for which party. The problem is that in its simplest form, it removes the influence of locality, which is emphasized in the American system. There are numerous congressional districts within a state that each elect their own congressional representative, and the districts are created by the state legislature. 

Secondly, voters in a proportional representation system typically vote for a party, whereas the American system emphasizes voting for individual candidates. Of course, many simply vote straight ticket and never think about the candidates anyways, so this might not be that much of a barrier. 

One benefit of this alternative system is that it puts ideas at the forefront, rather than personalities. 

Another benefit is that it would lessen the controversy over gerrymandering legislative districts, which is when state legislatures purposely alter districts to center those who vote for their opponent party in one district while spreading out those who vote for their party to maximize their chance of electoral victory. 

Nevertheless, charisma and competence are important qualities in political leadership.

It is also important that candidates ultimately feel accountable to their constituents, rather than their party bureaucracy, especially when complicated issues arise. Sometimes personality is an effective indicator of who will do this.

Primaries would be helpful in this instance, and to root out those with egregiously flawed pasts, but further reforms would be necessary to encourage more involvement in them by a broader portion of the population. 

One way to fix this would be through a scheme of mixed-member proportional representation. In such a system, there would be set aside a number of “proportional representation seats” in the legislature. Citizens would then continue to vote for their respective party candidate in each district, the total party vote would be added up, and the proportion of total votes granted to each party would be considered. 

The proportion of district seats won in the legislature per party would then be subtracted from this total proportion per party, and the proportional representation seats would be divided up based on the resulting proportions.

The proportionality candidates could be voted for in an “at-large” format, by a second primary of the entire party voting bloc. 

Alternatively, the party candidates with the most votes who still lost their general election in a particular district could automatically become eligible for the proportionality seats awarded to the party. 

This would save money by removing the need for a second primary election and would still ensure that candidates have local accountability. 

Such a system would enable constituents to choose who they think is the best candidate, from the best party, rather than who they think has the highest likelihood of winning. This would also be beneficial for those who feel that voting is choosing the better of two evils. 

For example, if someone votes based on pro-life convictions and the major party candidates in a particular state cower away from the issue, they could simply cast their vote for a third-party representative. 

In this system they would have a much higher chance of their vote counting to win a seat for this third party in the legislature, as they could count on votes from across the country from similarly disaffected individuals instead of relying on votes from one particular district for a particular candidate to win a seat. 

This would act as an encouragement to vote, and would likely make people more satisfied and happy citizens. 

Ballot access, however, would still present an issue. The duopoly controls the electoral system, and as such controls ballot access requirements. Often the best a third party can hope for is being permitted to run a campaign for a write-in candidate. 

The problem with write-in campaigns is that voters have a high chance of not even knowing who the write-in candidate or party is until after the elections are over, if ever. So such campaigns depend on disaffected voters doing an extensive amount of research beforehand, and such voters are rare and tend to be more widely distributed than major party voters. 

This wide distribution of disaffected voters would not be as significant of an issue in a proportional representation system, however, as total votes for a party would still be pooled into a single proportion, and helping people to understand this could act as an encouragement for people to vote third party without fear of “losing” their vote.

In the end, choice is a moderating force. If someone is forced to choose a political party based on one or two issues, they learn to not only justify the rest of the issues a party supports but also to justify the personal flaws of the candidates they support. 

That’s called cognitive dissonance. The result is political extremes, bent in the direction of party leaders and party donors. 

Even more than that, in the current system there is a temptation for parties to endorse incohesive and contradictory policies to gain the vote of disparate special interest groups. 

More troubling is that voters are unable to do anything to stop or speak out against this kind of behavior without jeopardizing their party’s political advantage, and thus potentially sacrificing other issues that are more important to them.

The major political parties in the duopoly are too focused on winning elections, and the net result has been a government that is largely viewed as ineffective, corrupt, and unrepresentative. 

Mixed-member proportional representation may not be the perfect solution to reform U.S. politics, but it might just set the nation on a more healthy path.